I'm not sure why you're re-posting a paragraph from a dissent, but, as I have written previously: It's a dissent. Alito lost.
What's more, that was a dissent for literally just him and Thomas. It's an extremist, losing view. And the most likely justice to join them in most dissents was the one who wrote the majority: Gorsuch.
I'm not sure why you're re-posting a paragraph from a dissent, but, as I have written previously: It's a dissent. Alito lost.
What's more, that was a dissent for literally just him and Thomas. It's an extremist, losing view. And the most likely justice to join them in most dissents was the one who wrote the majority: Gorsuch.
The Justice Department's argument is fallacious for overgeneralizing the Bostock ruling on Title VII to Title IX, potentially ignoring crucial differences in context, legislative intent, and practical implications between employment and education law.
Both Bostock v. Clayton County and Title IX deal with sex discrimination, but they are distinct in several ways. Bostock specifically addressed employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, whereas Title IX focuses on educational settings. These are separate statutes with different scopes, legislative histories, and enforcement mechanisms. Title IX involves unique educational considerations like sports participation and campus housing, which weren't addressed in Bostock. Additionally, the case law and regulatory frameworks for Title VII and Title IX have developed independently over time. Although some argue for applying Bostock's reasoning to Title IX, this extension is not universally accepted and remains subject to ongoing legal debates. These differences underscore that despite some parallels, Bostock and Title IX operate in separate legal spheres with their own distinct challenges and interpretations.
Labrador v. Poe is unrelated to this discussion as it concerns a different legal issue altogether, likely involving distinct parties and legal principles not connected to sex discrimination or LGBTQ+ rights in employment or education.
I donтАЩt know what this is тАФ it reads like an AI-generated response тАФ but itтАЩs nothing more than a rehash of points IтАЩve addressed a hundred times over the past three months in my coverage.
Feel free to read that, but IтАЩve more than adequately responded to this in that coverage.
Your statement, "The department made the Supreme CourtтАЩs own action earlier this year in *Labrador v. Poe* тАФ granting a partial stay of a lower court injunction blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors," is false for the following reasons:
Misrepresentation of the Supreme Court's Action:
1. Incorrect Description of the Lower Court's Injunction:
- The statement implies that the Supreme Court granted a partial stay of a lower court injunction, which was blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors.
- Reality: The lower court had indeed issued an injunction that blocked IdahoтАЩs Vulnerable Child Protection Act (which included the ban on gender-affirming care for minors). This injunction prevented the law from being enforced while the case was being litigated.
2. Misinterpretation of the Partial Stay:
- The statement suggests that the Supreme Court's partial stay continued to block the ban.
- Reality: The Supreme CourtтАЩs partial stay did not continue to block the ban. Instead, it partially lifted the lower court's injunction, thereby allowing some provisions of Idaho's ban on gender-affirming care to go into effect while the appeal was pending. The partial stay allowed Idaho to enforce parts of the Vulnerable Child Protection Act that had been previously blocked by the lower court.
The department made the Supreme CourtтАЩs own action earlier this year in Labrador v. Poe тАФ granting a partial stay of a lower court injunction blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors тАФ central to its argument. There, the high courtтАЩs majority held that the scope of that injunction тАФ a statewide injunction of the entire law тАФ was inappropriate given the plaintiffs and their claims.
The statement incorrectly implies that the Supreme Court's partial stay kept the lower court's blocking of the ban in place. In reality, the Supreme CourtтАЩs partial stay lifted part of the lower courtтАЩs blocking injunction, enabling Idaho to enforce aspects of its ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors. The statement mischaracterizes the Supreme Court's action and the effect of the partial stay on IdahoтАЩs law.
YouтАЩve rehashed the same thing four times in this response, said nothing, and clearly donтАЩt understand what IтАЩve written.
And, most importantly, IтАЩve not тАЬmischaracterizedтАЭ anything. Even your response (it still reads like an AI-generated response) does not describe a mischaracterization.
You clearly disagree with what IтАЩm writing, but that doesnтАЩt make me wrong. And, IтАЩve explained why I think the arguments against the rule are weak over the past three months.
I'm not sure why you're re-posting a paragraph from a dissent, but, as I have written previously: It's a dissent. Alito lost.
What's more, that was a dissent for literally just him and Thomas. It's an extremist, losing view. And the most likely justice to join them in most dissents was the one who wrote the majority: Gorsuch.
In short: So what?
The Justice Department's argument is fallacious for overgeneralizing the Bostock ruling on Title VII to Title IX, potentially ignoring crucial differences in context, legislative intent, and practical implications between employment and education law.
Both Bostock v. Clayton County and Title IX deal with sex discrimination, but they are distinct in several ways. Bostock specifically addressed employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, whereas Title IX focuses on educational settings. These are separate statutes with different scopes, legislative histories, and enforcement mechanisms. Title IX involves unique educational considerations like sports participation and campus housing, which weren't addressed in Bostock. Additionally, the case law and regulatory frameworks for Title VII and Title IX have developed independently over time. Although some argue for applying Bostock's reasoning to Title IX, this extension is not universally accepted and remains subject to ongoing legal debates. These differences underscore that despite some parallels, Bostock and Title IX operate in separate legal spheres with their own distinct challenges and interpretations.
Labrador v. Poe is unrelated to this discussion as it concerns a different legal issue altogether, likely involving distinct parties and legal principles not connected to sex discrimination or LGBTQ+ rights in employment or education.
Hope this this helps you? The logic is simple.
I donтАЩt know what this is тАФ it reads like an AI-generated response тАФ but itтАЩs nothing more than a rehash of points IтАЩve addressed a hundred times over the past three months in my coverage.
Feel free to read that, but IтАЩve more than adequately responded to this in that coverage.
Read "Over Ruled" it will help you.
Your statement, "The department made the Supreme CourtтАЩs own action earlier this year in *Labrador v. Poe* тАФ granting a partial stay of a lower court injunction blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors," is false for the following reasons:
Misrepresentation of the Supreme Court's Action:
1. Incorrect Description of the Lower Court's Injunction:
- The statement implies that the Supreme Court granted a partial stay of a lower court injunction, which was blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors.
- Reality: The lower court had indeed issued an injunction that blocked IdahoтАЩs Vulnerable Child Protection Act (which included the ban on gender-affirming care for minors). This injunction prevented the law from being enforced while the case was being litigated.
2. Misinterpretation of the Partial Stay:
- The statement suggests that the Supreme Court's partial stay continued to block the ban.
- Reality: The Supreme CourtтАЩs partial stay did not continue to block the ban. Instead, it partially lifted the lower court's injunction, thereby allowing some provisions of Idaho's ban on gender-affirming care to go into effect while the appeal was pending. The partial stay allowed Idaho to enforce parts of the Vulnerable Child Protection Act that had been previously blocked by the lower court.
The department made the Supreme CourtтАЩs own action earlier this year in Labrador v. Poe тАФ granting a partial stay of a lower court injunction blocking IdahoтАЩs ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors тАФ central to its argument. There, the high courtтАЩs majority held that the scope of that injunction тАФ a statewide injunction of the entire law тАФ was inappropriate given the plaintiffs and their claims.
The statement incorrectly implies that the Supreme Court's partial stay kept the lower court's blocking of the ban in place. In reality, the Supreme CourtтАЩs partial stay lifted part of the lower courtтАЩs blocking injunction, enabling Idaho to enforce aspects of its ban on gender-affirming medical care for minors. The statement mischaracterizes the Supreme Court's action and the effect of the partial stay on IdahoтАЩs law.
YouтАЩve rehashed the same thing four times in this response, said nothing, and clearly donтАЩt understand what IтАЩve written.
And, most importantly, IтАЩve not тАЬmischaracterizedтАЭ anything. Even your response (it still reads like an AI-generated response) does not describe a mischaracterization.
You clearly disagree with what IтАЩm writing, but that doesnтАЩt make me wrong. And, IтАЩve explained why I think the arguments against the rule are weak over the past three months.
You are upset.